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Transit: An analysis of networked criminal groups 
and criminal opportunities at transit ports
Ryan Casey1*
Abstract: Like the path of many contraband commodities, trafficked cultural  objects 
cross countless legal borders and intersect with the legitimate market world at a 
number of critical transit junctures, which supports the concept of a single “grey” 
market. These transit settings, where different elements of trafficking networks 
must converge, are sites of vulnerability for criminals and opportunity for law en-
forcement intervention. For this discussion, the case study of Subhash Kapoor’s traf-
ficking network will be used as a frame of reference throughout the essay to support 
the idea that a port, as an interface in the global supply chain, is a critical site for 
analysis and understanding of international trafficking in cultural objects. What 
follows is a discussion of conceptualisations of organised crime in late modernity, a 
spatial analysis of the global cultural heritage trade, and an overview of the securiti-
sation and role of sea ports in trade.
Subjects: Transnationalism; Security Studies - Pol & Intl Relns; Criminology and  Criminal 
Justice; International Trade (incl. trade agreements & tariffs); Museum and Heritage 
 Studies; Culture; Archaeology; Politics of Archaeology; Heritage
Keywords: trafficking networks; cultural property crime; smuggling; international trade; 
transnational criminology; transit; cultural property trade; organised crime; illicit antiquities
1. Introduction
Throughout the sequence of events that make up antiquity trafficking networks, there is neglected 
opportunity on the part of law enforcement to intervene within the complex realm of transit secu-
rity. Like the path of many contraband commodities, trafficked cultural objects cross countless legal 
borders and intersect with the legal world at a number of critical transit junctures: customs, law 
enforcement, tariffs/taxes, licensing and certification, shipping and inspection, border control, pur-
chase and sales records, audits, government accounting, and the courts. These processes provide a 
better understanding of the supply-demand nexus of networked criminal groups and how much 
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contact they maintain with the legal hurdles of regulated trade and trade security. For this analysis, 
the recently on trial and well-known trafficking network associated with Subhash Kapoor will be 
used as a case study throughout to discuss the larger concerns of: (1) conceptualizing organized 
crime in late modern times; (2) a spatial analysis of the global antiquity trade; (3) an overview of 
trade ports and heightened security measures; (4) regulatory responses at ports; and, (5) implica-
tions for the future of transnational antiquities trafficking.
2. Case study
Subhash Chandra Kapoor is the former owner of “Art of the Past,” an art and antiquities gallery in 
New York and also Nimbus Import Export, Inc., a shipping company located at the same address 
(St. Hilaire, 2012). He has been involved in many cases of idol smuggling in India, especially from 
temples in Tamil Nadu, and is currently awaiting trial in several national jurisdictions (Felch, 2015; 
Selvaraj, 2012). In a criminal confession to the Indian magistrate in 2012, he described his career 
trajectory from the time he worked in his father’s antique shop in Delhi, to when he moved to New 
York and opened his own gallery in 1987; he later created the Nimbus Import Export company in 
2003 with his brother and daughter for trading purposes (Felch, 2012, 2015). In order to supply his 
gallery, he travelled to Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and 
India for contacts (ibid.). Kapoor established connections with a group of “business contacts, com-
mission agents and dealers” (Idol Wing-CID, 2009) through a friend based in Chennai, Arcelia Gallery 
owner Sanjivi Asokan. However, these contacts were a gang of local temple thieves to whom he 
promised lucrative profits. Kapoor himself visited the Arulmigu Sundareswarar and Varadaraja 
Perumal temples in Tamil Nadu with the thieves and selected which Chola-period bronze idols he 
wished for them to take (Felch, 2015). From New York, he then wired them several hundred thou-
sand dollars to break into the temples, steal the idols, transport the objects to Asokan’s gallery in 
Chennai, have them restored, gather false documentation, and then smuggle via shipment to the 
United States (Felch, 2015; Selvaraj, 2012). In order to obtain false documentation, Asokan brought 
the idols (mixed in with modern versions as a disguise) to the Office of the Handicraft and presented 
them to the development commissioner of the Ministry of Textiles, Shastri Bhavan, for an official 
Handicraft certificate which states the idols were Artistic Handicraft Products (Idol Wing-CID, 2009). 
Asokan then presented an export license with the false certification to his agent Pakia Kumar, where 
it was loaded onto a shipment in Chennai through an export company called Ever Star International 
Services.
The shipment first travelled to Hong Kong and then London before Nimbus Imports Exports re-
ceived it in New York (Felch, 2015). Kapoor then created a false provenance for the idols by claiming 
they were from the family collection of Selina Mohammed, his romantic partner at the time; he ad-
mitted in confession he had also used the name of a fake private collector in the past (ibid.). However, 
after a property-dispute case in Singapore between Kapoor and another former romantic partner, 
Paramaspry Punusamy, she contacted the Idol Wing team of the Tamil Nadu police (who were al-
ready investigating Kapoor) and gave them the whereabouts of Kapoor’s recent movements and an 
updated photograph of him for law enforcement to use to identify him more easily (Selvaraj, 2012). 
In October 2011, Kapoor was arrested in Germany after Interpol issued a warrant for his arrest and 
extradited to India on charges of trafficking stolen art (Felch, 2015; Selvaraj, 2012). After the crimi-
nal trial in India, the Manhattan D.A. office plans to extradite Kapoor to the US for more charges 
following the successful convictions of his associates: gallery manager Aaron Freeman, girlfriend 
Selina Mohamed, and sister Sushma Sareen (Felch, 2015). Given the name Operation Hidden Idol, 
the US-led investigation into Kapoor has successfully seized many looted antiquities associated with 
his criminal network, and although considered proceeds of crime, the idols are in the process of re-
patriation back to Tamil Nadu. This case study is not necessarily an exception to the norm, but it is 
unusual for a trafficking network to be so thoroughly investigated and adjudicated from the identi-
fication of the thieves all the way to intervening in the auction houses that have attempted to sell 
the idols on the market. The evidence gathered surrounding the methods Kapoor used to trade and 
move the objects and the attention given to transit ports in the investigation all together, is perhaps 
indicative of why the case was so successfully conducted and prosecuted.
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3. Discourse on organized crime
The definition of “organized crime” is a politicized and debatable discourse - especially its acknowl-
edgement in international cultural property trade research (inter alia: Alder & Polk, 2002, 2005; 
Chappell & Polk, 2011; Mackenzie, 2005, 2009, 2011; Proulx, 2010; Tijhuis, 2006). Similar in principle 
to many other international or national definitions of organized crime, the UK National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (2001 cited in Mackenzie, 2002) defines it as: “two or more persons jointly en-
gaged in continuing serious criminal activities for substantial profit or gain, whether based in the UK 
or elsewhere”. For those who buy into the stereotyped idea of grouped professional criminals who 
use violent and corrupt tactics in the pursuit of illegal profit, the NCIS definition may seem broad. 
However, organized crime groups are becoming more entrepreneurial and trafficking a number of 
different commodities for profit as they morph into “multi-component” networks; they are increas-
ingly fluid and adaptable compared to static, out-dated notions of organized crime (Mackenzie, 
2002). The networks being established overseas in various consumer markets are constantly evolving 
in accordance with the ebbs and flows of late modern capitalism; the present state of things charac-
terized by neoliberal global economies, reflexivity, and information technology (Giddens, 1991).
One way to analyse the relationship between international antiquities trafficking and organized 
crime is the “criminals in the market” approach: to view organized crime as a group of opportunistic 
professional criminals infiltrating the cultural objects market (Mackenzie, 2011, p. 69). This approach 
is grounded in the many rumours and questionable reports of antiquities being used as laundering 
placeholders for drug money or funds for other international illicit activities, which is linked to larger 
systemic issues of local political and bureaucratic corruption, militias in conflict states, and mafia/
organized crime groups (ibid.). However, in addition to its unfounded conception, applying it to the 
Kapoor case is too extreme. Though he participates in criminal activities, Kapoor is also a legitimate 
seller of antiquities who happens to use his shop to also sell looted and stolen objects. The other 
people involved in the trafficking network were hired and paid on a contractual basis - not because 
of bonded, social loyalties that would often be associated with traditional understandings of mafias. 
Paoli (2002, p. 55) and Finckenauer (2005) are actually of the opinion that the term “organized crime” 
is too “ethnically loaded” and distracts from the reality of how organized crime manifests and oper-
ates in modern times. Furthermore, this perspective of understanding it as “criminals in the market” 
is difficult to prove, as finding definitive links between different stages of a transnational criminal 
network is an almost-impossible endeavor. A more understanding approach from this angle is to 
consider the sector vulnerability of a market, which measures how vulnerable a market is to organ-
ized criminal activities compared to others and how to reduce the attractiveness of the market to 
organized crime (Albanese, 2008; Beken, 2004; Mackenzie, 2011). However, this model conceptual-
izes organized crime as a homogenous phenomena; or arguably, like a contagion. The very definition 
and manifestations of organized crime are far too complex and misunderstood to be assessed so 
uniformly, as though it is something a susceptible market can be inoculated against. The manifesta-
tions of organized criminal activity in late modern consumer markets is much more characteristically 
dispersed and looks more anatomically like a series of nodes connected by lines than a pyramid of 
power (Mackenzie & Davis, 2014). Therefore, the “criminals in the market” perspective needs to be 
developed further for it to be helpful in understanding the complexities of organized crime.
Another approach is an inversion of the former: viewing the “market as criminal”: the international 
market in antiquities as inherently illicit or criminal in nature (Mackenzie, 2011, p. 69). The structural 
organization of the market could then be perceived as consisting of: thieves/looters, smugglers, 
shady dealers, sellers, and buyers of illicit commodities (Mackenzie, 2011; Polk, 2000). This perspec-
tive of the market is linked to the “spectrum of enterprise” approach to defining organized crime 
proposed by Smith (1980) and applied to cultural property trafficking by Mackenzie (2011) which 
identifies global trade as always more or less licit or illicit. Arguably, the spectral theory of criminal 
networks is a mediated solution to the debate surrounding the nature of organized crime. It  accounts 
for the complexity of activities a criminal network may be involved in and the blurred lines of crime. 
However, most of the literature on the spectral theory of enterprise is supported either in abstract 
social theory or within a narrow and clustered range of geographical sites, which is often a flaw in 
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research from a Global North perspective (Dietzler, 2013; Fraser, 2013, p. 251; see: Edwards & Gill, 
2002, 2003; Mackenzie, 2011; Mackenzie & Davis, 2014; Smith, 1980). Zhang and Chin (2003, p. 485) 
describe organized crime as consisting of enterprising agents with no identifiable allegiances, 
 structures, or set of norms; in a sense, they can be perceived as “structurally deficient” which cor-
roborates the implied imagery of a network. Rather than being exclusively deviant, certain interna-
tional criminal markets such as the antiquities market, are dominated by small, entrepreneurial 
groups of traders who do not identify with a larger organized criminal affiliation, and who connect 
with each other through sporadic operations necessary to the business (Mackenzie & Davis, 2014; 
Zhang & Chin, 2003). This understanding of criminal groups being networked better explains the 
relations between the individuals in Subhash Kapoor’s trafficking network. The connections between 
the thieves and Kapoor was business-like and impersonal; furthermore, the Idol Wing-CID report 
(2009) provided evidence that both Asokan and the thieves were independently in the business of 
stealing idols for others as well, not just employees of Kapoor.
Therefore, the global cultural property marketplace should be understood of as a “grey” market 
rather than mutually exclusive legitimate and illegitimate markets (Bowman, 2008; Mackenzie, 
2011; Polk, 2000). Similarly, Nordstrom (2007, p. xviii) refers to it as “il/legality”—or the intersection 
of legality and illegality. The reality of the antiquities trade is that the flow of objects—which can 
become licit or illicit by a variety of means—are intermixed and, therefore, the unified market they 
all enter is considered “grey-tinted”; oftentimes, dealers may condemn the trade of looted artefacts 
in public, but practice complacency or even participation in private (Mackenzie, 2011, pp. 72–73). In 
the academic discourse of corporate crime, this can be understood as “creative compliance”: where 
the letter of the law is enforced without the spirit of the law (McBarnet, 2006, p. 1091). It can afford 
antiquities traders the protection of claiming the law has been followed, in instances of illicit activity, 
without actually enforcing what the law set out to accomplish. This sort of behavior only contributes 
to the larger problem of unreported criminal activities (dark figure of crime) and the immeasurable 
scale of global trafficking in cultural property. Although international figures are often inaccurate or 
sensationalized, the global profits of the illicit economy represent a significant part of the world’s 
economic system and politics (Dietzler, 2013; Nordstrom, 2007). However, no official data or statis-
tics exist to assess the impact of laundered currency on a nation’s financial stability, global security, 
nor the extent of organized crime activity in antiquities trafficking (Nordstrom, 2007). Dietzler (2013) 
suggestion of redirecting researchers from the question of whether organized crime—particularly 
out-dated notions of it—is involved in the trade of illicit antiquities, towards the study of dynamics 
of organized and criminal trafficking could prove a more meaningful endeavor.
4. Spatial understanding of the trade
Networked criminal enterprises and trafficking networks are a consequence of neoliberal capitalism 
– characterized by the privatization of markets - and the proliferation of “grey” economies, which 
exist in the international sphere, beyond most enforceable jurisdictions (Nordstrom, 2007). 
Governments often allow minor business “irregularities” for the sake of maintaining national profits 
and accommodate “creative compliance” to law in global markets (McBarnet, 2006; Nordstrom, 
2007). Countries that rely on the transnational flow of commodities construct: duty-free zones, eco-
nomic processing zones, free trade zones, non-bank dollar licenses, and trade deals (which reduce 
taxes for national social services) in order to attract more trade (Nordstrom, 2007, p. 86). However, 
criminal networks also benefit from these zones through unregulated trade, illicit profits, undeclared 
trade goods, smuggling, money laundering, and other innovative ways of profit-making (ibid.). The 
expansion of the global trade in commodities is rooted in the context of economic and political 
transformations as consequence of a global consumer-society and conditions made easier by coun-
tries dependent on such consumption (Eski, 2011; Nordstrom, 2007).
When conceptualizing a theoretical model to represent the trade of cultural property, it is impor-
tant to reflect the realities of global capitalism and range of activities that comprise the trade. In 
Scheper-Hughes (2004, p. 36) study of the international trade in human organs, she adamantly de-
fended the use of an older “core-periphery” model of global capitalism which emphasized 
Page 5 of 10
Casey, Cogent Social Sciences (2017), 3: 1301182
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1301182
mercantilism. Her model was three-pronged and consisted of: donor, transfer, and recipient nations. 
Similarly, most criminological literature on the trafficking of cultural property reflects a three-
pronged division of events: source, transit, and market nations (inter alia: Alder & Polk, 2002; 
Bowman, 2008; Mackenzie, 2009, 2011; Polk, 2014). Scheper-Hughes (2004) defended her use of the 
outdated model as a political stance against the direction the discourse was headed and the grow-
ing trend of using abstract terminology that she felt was a distraction from the content and quality 
of her research. However, the same sort of model is continuously used in antiquities trafficking lit-
erature without such stated motives. The three-prong model for understanding the division of activi-
ties and locations in antiquities trafficking delineates basic information, but it simplifies many 
complex events and processes which could arguably be better understood through a different lens.
Felson (2006) argues the emphasis of organized crime research (though it could be expanded to 
include a majority of transnational crimes) should be on: (1) specific and tangible events; (2) their 
sequences; and, (3) their settings. Meaning, the criminal acts and their connections to one another 
should be the organizing principle rather than the actors. He also identifies that one of the biggest 
distractions in scholarly understandings of organized crime is the “understating of the diversity of 
criminal cooperation” (2006, p. 6). While it has been demonstrated that the network approach to 
understanding organized crime creates a helpful visual and more flexible interpretation, it still does 
not explain the flows of influence, capital, and power throughout the network (ibid.). The structure of 
criminal groups in modern times is characteristically fluid; though recognition of the social capital of 
a network is helpful (see: Lo, 2010), it does not provide a solution for intervention. Therefore, the 
spatial theory proposed by Felson (2006) offers a more insightful analysis of transnational crimes by 
viewing the entire phenomenon as a sequence of events. The settings where the events occur, and 
where unstable networks find a degree of stability, are known as “offender convergence settings” 
(Felson, 2006, p. 9). These settings, where different elements or network members of the criminal 
sequence must converge or transition, are sites of vulnerability for a criminal network to law en-
forcement intervention or engagement. For criminal networks involved in the trafficking of cultural 
property, these convergence settings can include: settings for transactions such as local market-
places or private properties, and settings for transfers such as transit ports. Or for the case of 
Subhash Kapoor, they would include: Asokan’s gallery, the shipping port in Chennai, the transit stops 
in Hong Kong and London, the receiver port in New York, transfer to warehouse, and delivery to 
Kapoor’s gallery. For the case study of Kapoor, there are many convergences that occur during tran-
sit and especially at sea ports. Therefore, it is vital to understand the role transit ports play in the 
trade of global commodities, and especially how cultural objects pass through port sites.
5. The role of commercial sea ports in transit
For those who participate in international trading, economic globalization only further diminishes 
the sovereignty of countries and their potential to control trade dynamics in and out of their jurisdic-
tion (Nordstrom, 2007, p. 115). For those who operate in the spaces of transit ports, “movement is 
primary, borders are secondary. Laws, some might argue, are tertiary” (ibid.). Commercial sea ports 
facilitate the uninterrupted flow of commodities and services between national jurisdictions and 
across large expanses of unregulated water. It is important to understand that transit is not just the 
time or distance between two points, but a universe of processes and meanings (Nordstrom, 2007). 
This is why the three-prong understanding of transnational cultural property trafficking does not 
suffice; transit is not an action or place, but a sum of many complex processes. The routes used for 
transport are vital to the flow of commodities—both licit and illicit. Therefore, an important consid-
eration for solutions to intervening in the trafficking of illegal antiquities is how objects are imported 
and exported at these transit ports. The unregulated nature of ports leaves them vulnerable to being 
utilized by criminal networks for shipping and advancing their criminal opportunities (Nordstrom, 
2007). In the Kapoor case, transit ports were vital to the trafficking scheme of idols from India to the 
United States. Asokan, the middleman dealer in Chennai, knew how to acquire fake documentation 
which he knew would not be closely inspected by the Indian Ministry of Textiles or shipping company 
in Chennai (Idol Wing-CID, 2009). Furthermore, the lay-overs in large ports such as Hong Kong and 
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London ensured the least likelihood of inspection due to heavy traffic (see: Eski, 2011) while also 
accumulating provenance for the objects along the way.
Twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs, aka containers) are the classic 20 × 8 × 8 foot metal contain-
ers which make up the majority of modern shipping (Nordstrom, 2007). Average container ships 
carry around 1,700 containers although sturdier ones can carry up to 3,000, 6,000, or even 8,000 
containers (ibid.). They are ideal for smuggling because not every container is checked; the inspec-
tion of containers is an intensive (and expensive) operation and they are impossible to enter without 
going through the motions of a bureaucratic process which leads to days of work if every single box 
were to be checked (Eski, 2011; Flynn, 2004). In the current economic climate, somewhere between 
80 and 90% of world trade is conducted by the international shipping industry (Eski, 2011; Frittelli, 
2005; Nordstrom, 2007). Around 50,000 ships are registered in 150 countries worldwide and manned 
by a diverse and international staff (Nordstrom, 2007, p. 115). Even the most technological-savvy 
ports can inspect a maximum of only 5% of goods passing through customs, with about 1% stopped 
for random inspection (ibid.). Usual suspicious activities caught by customs include: underdeclaring 
the value of goods; wrongly declaring what the goods are; incorrect paperwork; and, improper prac-
tices such as smuggling. Before the current 9/11 “securityscape” (Eski, 2011), US Customs prioritized 
the prevention of smuggling and misevaluation at ports (Peterson, 2014a). Now, however, imports 
are analysed by Customs as security risks and their technologies to inspect and examine incoming 
shipments are more efficient and advanced: flight data is digitally recorded by Automated Manifest 
Systems; courier services transmit mandatory Importer Security Filing details before departure; first-
time importers are frequently inspected because of their lack of established record of shipping into 
the US; and certain commodities and countries of origin are flagged for inspection (Peterson, 2014a). 
For the Kapoor case, this could arguably be a reason for intentionally passing the idols through Hong 
Kong and London; as major ports who conduct frequent trade business with the US, it would raise 
less alarms than a shipment received from India.
The first and cursory exam conducted by US Customs is: a VACIS exam or Non-Intrusive Inspection 
(NII) - similar to a basic X-ray scan where the container is run through an X-ray machine at the sea-
port terminal and the pictures are reviewed to determine if the container needs to be opened and 
inspected or even taken to a Customs Exam Sites (CES) to be stripped (Peterson, 2014b). For U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol, turn-around time for basic NIIs is 2–3 days and they charge $150–$350 
to the importer per container for this service (the price escalates if further inspection is needed) 
(ibid.). However, exams and inspections like this US VACIS exam is time-consuming and creates bad 
relations with client-businesses. In an interview with a harbourmaster, Nordstrom (2007, p. 119) 
noted the man confessed that there is a political-economic pressure to allow containers through the 
ports without inspection, in order to avoid gridlock and trouble with the businesses that use their 
service. For these reasons, transnational smuggling organizations utilize commercial maritime 
routes in order to “blend in”, whether or not the commodity needs to be laundered like cultural prop-
erty does (Eski, 2011; McNicholas, 2008). Ports are ideal hubs of smuggling operations, such as that 
of Kapoor’s, because of the ease in inserting illicit goods through their channels (Eski, 2011, p. 418; 
Kostakos & Antonopoulos, 2010; McNicholas, 2008; Zaitch, 2002).
6. Regulatory response at transit ports
In an interview with an anonymous international businessman under the alias “Richard”, Nordstrom 
(2007, p. 64) recorded: “I even smuggle things out of customs myself. I’ll put in for a shipment, and 
about the time it’s to arrive, I call daily to find out its whereabouts, if it has docked. I have my 
‘friends’ at the port—people who have made a little extra for helping me in the past. They let me 
know when it’s in and where it is; and when I arrive at the port, they let me in and turn their heads 
while I get what I need. I even put important packages under my seat and drive out the port gates 
like that. Smuggle, you might call it. And I wave to all my friends from other businesses who are do-
ing the same.”
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Maritime realms, commercial seaports in particular, play a vital role in the global economy and are 
an important site of international security and regulation. While international laws regarding trade 
imports and exports, such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention or 1974 IMO-SOLAS Convention (and its 
ISPS amendment), provide basic regulative standards, the enforcement of these conventions is nev-
ertheless grounded in national authority (Eski, 2011; Wenning et al., 2007). The networks of global 
trade are often considered to be too fluid to be governed by individual countries, which leads to ne-
glected regulation of “grey market” economics that fall outside the jurisdiction of state intervention 
(Nordstrom, 2007). Ironically, in a system that contradicts itself, international conventions and sys-
tems of regulation are only meant to be necessary when national laws are insufficient (Mackenzie, 
2015, p. 151). However, if the national level of uncontrolled trading practices were to be addressed, 
it would have to balance the emphasis on supply and demand control, rather than just focusing on 
one side as law enforcement tends to do unsuccessfully (ibid.). Therefore, within the larger sequence 
of events that make up the global trade in cultural property, the nexus of supply-demand is a critical 
point in the sequence for intervention and regulation. Some scholars argue a system such as the dia-
mond Kimberley Process should be introduced to the antiquities market, which would actually target 
transit control (Mackenzie, 2015, p. 152). The Kimberley Process enforces a standardized system of 
certification that ascertains the identities of importers and exporters and the values of shipments, 
which in theory, would make trade more transparent (ibid.). However, when a participating state is a 
transit state for any shipment, the shipment must remain unopened and not tampered with, even if 
deemed suspicious (Mackenzie, 2015, p. 152; Murphy, 2012). This aspect, as well as the so-called 
“positives” of the Process do not enforce any rules or laws smugglers in antiquities have not already 
demonstrably manipulated or abused. In fact, the rules of the Kimberley Process about regulating 
inspections by transit countries only makes the heightened security of global trade a more bureau-
cratic process.
The case of Subhash Kapoor happens to be a story of successful regulatory intervention in collabo-
ration with US and Indian agencies in investigating a transnational trafficking network. The Port of 
Newark (New York/New Jersey) is a site of commercial transit in the United States that hosts US 
Customs officers, some of which have specialized knowledge in cultural property (Kohn, 2015). In 
2007, the Indian Consulate contacted Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) cultural property divi-
sion via Interpol with the name of a suspicious import export company linked to Subhash Kapoor 
expected to receive a shipment containing seven crates claimed as garden sets, but which actually 
contained stolen Indian cultural property (Kohn, 2015; St. Hilaire, 2012). The smuggled cultural prop-
erty was shipped in a container through Newark with a declaration claiming to be: “1 stone garden 
table set and 2 white table sets.” The declaration was clearly inaccurate based on the visible size of 
the shipment package (Kohn, 2015). In a documentary directed by Kohn (2015), a retired Customs 
officer admits there are certain preferred code words smugglers use which can be used to identify 
suspect packages such as “handicraft.” Past bills of lading for shipments from Ever Star International 
Service to Nimbus Import Export, Inc. show shipments being received since 2006 with declarations 
such as: “brass handicraft items”; “Indian handmade artistic articles”; “brass Indian handmade ar-
tistic articles”; “Indian handmade artistic handicraft articles”; and “Indian artistic handicraft” (St. 
Hilaire, 2012). After the interception of this shipment by US Customs, HIS and Customs cooperated 
with one another to form a database of archives on Kapoor’s trade activities: official faxes; flight 
information such as air carriers, container ships, sites of unloading, and transfers; detailed container 
status reports such as times of freight arrival to port, VACIS exams, release times from NII exam, 
transit to warehouses, and availability for pick-up; shipment catalogues; shipping groups; manifest 
information such as declaration of type of goods; sales records including signatures; export licenses; 
and the names of businesses such as courier services used (Kohn, 2015). The database collected by 
HSI serves as a way to understand patterns of behavior and identify weak points in the smuggling 
process. It also demonstrates that transit, as the least studied aspect of cultural property trafficking, 
is a valuable site for intervention because the paperwork involved in trade is a potential vulnerability 
for traffickers and source of intelligence and evidence for law enforcement. The day the US issued a 
warrant for Kapoor’s arrest was the same day they entered his storage unit at SOFIA storage centre 
in New York, where Kapoor housed 2,600 antiquities, all of which were seized by the authorities 
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(Felch, 2015). In addition to Kapoor, the Idol Wing of the Tamil Nadu Police Department details the 
arrest of Asokan and export agent Packia Kumar who ran Ever Star International Services and who 
allegedly exported illicit commodities disguised in shipments with newly crafted statues (Idol Wing-
CID, 2009). Then on 26 July 2012, ICE issued a press release of the seizure of: a 1,600 lb Buddha 
head; a life-size stone figure weighing 500 lbs.; 3 Chola period bronze sculptures (Uma Parvati, 
Sivagami Amman, Murugan); a sandstone statue (Kubera); a grey schist statue (Herkules-Vajrapani); 
and, a sculpture (Shakyamuni Buddham).
7. Future implications
Examining the transit smuggling methods surrounding the Kapoor case can aid law enforcement in 
the United States and India in their on-going investigations targeting Kapoor and his list of clients. 
Furthermore, it can also help policy makers, lawyers, Customs, and criminologists create better sys-
tems to detect, uncover, and prosecute future crimes related to the trafficking of cultural heritage 
(St. Hilaire, 2012). The purpose of this analysis was to unravel confusing terminology surround the 
global trade in cultural objects, create a more flexible conceptual framework, and focus attention on 
ports which are an overlooked aspect of commodity smuggling. From the in-depth analysis of sea 
ports and their relationship to the larger sequence of trafficking events, maritime ports can be better 
appreciated as complex intersections of insecurity and security (Chalk, 2008; Eski, 2011, p. 415). 
Furthermore, the role of Customs and port security in the Kapoor case reveals how vulnerable the 
setting is within the larger activities of criminal networks. Therefore, it is urged that more attention 
from international and national regulatory response agencies be focused upon transit ports as a site 
for intervention or disruption of smuggling. A comforting idea for the present, at least, is that federal 
agents are combing through Kapoor’s communication and file archives to build a picture of his glob-
al supply network (Felch, 2015) which will give further insight into the reaches of globalized crime 
networks.
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